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Thomas Aquinas and William E. Carroll on Creatio ex Nihilo:
A Response to Joseph Hannon’s “Theological Objections to a
Metaphysicalist Interpretation of Creation”
Ignacio Silva
ABSTRACT
Joseph Hannon has expressed a most surprising objection to
Aquinas scholar Prof William E. Carroll in his latest paper
“Theological Objections to a Metaphysicalist Interpretation of
Creation.” The main claim is that Prof. Carroll misunderstands
Aquinas’ doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by reducing it to a
metaphysical notion, rather than considering it in its full
theological sense. In this paper I show Hannon’s misinterpretation
of Carroll’s and Thomas Aquinas’ thought, particularly by stressing
the dependence that the doctrine of providence through secondary
causes has on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.
Joseph Hannon has expressed a most surprising objection to Aquinas scholar Prof
William E. Carroll in his latest paper “Theological Objections to a Metaphysicalist
Interpretation of Creation.”1 The main claim is that Prof Carroll misunderstands
Aquinas’ doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by reducing it to a metaphysical notion, rather
than considering it in its full theological sense. Bold objections such as those present in
Dr. Hannon’s paper require not only a profound understanding of Aquinas’ thought,
but a thorough reading of Prof Carroll’s own work. I believe Dr. Hannon’s paper,
however, lacks both these features, as almost anyone well acquainted with Aquinas’meta-
physics of creation and with Prof Carroll’s understanding of it could note.2
I hope to show in the pages to follow that this is an unfortunate misreading of Prof
Carroll’s teaching on the subject. Two comments are worth mentioning from the
outset. First, Prof Carroll has written extensively on this subject for over forty years in
many publications and lectured on it around the world; and second, as far as I know,
he has never received any objection against his teaching on the matter, a fact that
places his interpretation of this doctrine not only at the mainstream of Aquinas scholar-
ship today, but also at the forefront of the “regained momentum in recent literature” for
Thomistic perspectives on science and theology, as David Fergusson has put it lately.3
Prof Carroll is, together with Prof Michael Dodds, at the leadership of this new Thomistic
movement within theology and science.4 I shall follow the order Dr. Hannon used in his
own paper to show the shortcomings of his arguments against Prof Carroll.5
Perhaps Dr. Hannon’s most important worry, stated in the introduction, is to preserve
God’s ability to act in the world against what he sees as the alignment of Thomism with
naturalism. That is, Dr. Hannon sees in Prof Carroll’s defence of the doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo and the subsequent notion of the autonomy of nature in its activity a necessary
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rejection of God’s omnipotence, in the sense that were Prof Carroll’s teachings correct,
God would not be able to involve himself in the development of the universe and of
human history. This would indeed be something unacceptable and certainly undesirable.
As I will show, Dr. Hannon would do well in dropping his worry, since the very teachings
of Prof Carroll hold precisely what he wants to defend.
Unfortunately, to argue for his position, Dr. Hannon frequently misquotes Prof
Carroll and misinterprets his sayings on Aquinas. Take, for instance, the following
passage from the first section, on page 292: “Carroll is reticent about whether creatio
ex nihilo means that God actually produced anything material.” As Carroll repeatedly
notes when he writes about creation, God, as Creator, causes all things to be in whatever
way or ways they are. “All things” obviously includes material things, as Aquinas explains
when analysing the notion of creation and its relation to matter in his Summa Theologiae
I, q. 45, a. 4, ad 3: “matter does not exist except by creation; for creation is the production
of the whole being, and not only matter.” Ironically, Hannon continues his argument
thus: “More likely, he [Prof Carroll] thinks that all that what God did was to provide
the necessary cause that allows anything to exist at all.” To say that such an assertion
is “more likely,” is extraordinary since nowhere in his works does Prof Carroll claim
that God only provides a necessary cause for things to exist. On the contrary, as I
showed above, Prof Carroll holds that God’s act of creation involves the putting things
into existence in their whole being and, consequently, in all the operations they
perform, as I will show below.
It seems to me, rather, that Dr. Hannon has certainly misread Prof Carroll’s work. To
understand my claim, consider the way Dr. Hannon describes creation, in a previous
paragraph on the same page, as something that happened in the past affirming that
“Creatio ex nihilo, as properly understood, therefore means that God created all
things” (note the past tense of the verb “to create” and the way one must understand
this definition: “properly”!). Such statements cannot be further away from Prof Carroll’s
own thinking, who consistently highlights that God’s creation is a continuous act, the act
of giving and sustaining things in existence, and thus not simply an event in the past. On
many a page one can read statements in this regard: “Creation is not exclusively some
distant event; it is the continual, complete causing of the existence of whatever is. In a
fundamental sense, creation is not really an event at all.”6
Dr. Hannon follows his statements with what is, perhaps, the strongest evidence that
he has not fully understood Prof Carroll’s teachings on Aquinas (or even Aquinas’ own
teaching): “What Aquinas was not doing, however, was insisting that creation was
limited to a metaphysical explanation as to why anything existed at all – the crux of Car-
roll’s argument.” Again, anyone who has taken Prof Carroll’s work in their hands knows
of his paradigmatic insistence that Aquinas distinguished between a philosophical and a
theological sense of what it is to create. This distinction is paradigmatically presented in
Aquinas’ commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (In II Sent., dist. 1, q. 1. a. 2): “Not
only does faith hold that there is creation, but reason also demonstrates it.” Consider the
following explanation of these notions in the words of Prof Carroll:
Aquinas points out that there are two senses of creation out of nothing, one philosophical,
the other theological. The philosophical sense simply means that God, with no material
cause, makes all things to exist as entities that are radically different from His own being
yet completely dependent upon His causality… The theological sense of creation denies
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nothing of the philosophical sense but merely adds to it the notion that the created universe
is temporally finite. This theological sense of creation cannot be proven philosophically; it
can only be known through revelation.7
Just to avoid the temptation of accusing Prof Carroll of neglecting the theological sense in
his analysis of creation (as Dr. Hannon seems to be doing at some points in his text), con-
sider the following passage:
The affirmation in faith that the universe has a temporal beginning perfects what reason
knows about creation. Thomas’s theological analysis of creation is much richer than just
the recognition that the world has a beginning. He sees all things coming from and returning
to God. Furthermore, the entire universe of creatures, spiritual and material, possesses a
dynamic character, analogous to the internal dynamism of the Divine Persons of the
Trinity. With the eyes of faith one sees the whole created order as ‘footsteps’ of the
Trinity. Throughout, Thomas’s theological understanding of creation is informed by his
philosophical analysis; after all, Thomas is a philosopher because he is a theologian.8
It should not be necessary to continue my critique of this paragraph, but unfortu-
nately, it is precisely where Hannon misquotes Aquinas himself! Hannon quotes
Aquinas saying that “he [Aquinas] then explains that, ‘God created all things together
so far as regards their substance in some measure formless’.” If one were aware of Car-
roll’s distinction between both senses of creation, it would be evident that in Summa
Theologiae I, q. 74, a. 2 (the precise passage Dr. Hannon uses to attempt a refutation
of Prof Carroll’s arguments, and not a. 3 to which Dr. Hannon wrongly refers in his
text), Aquinas is doing hermeneutical theology, and not a metaphysical analysis of the
notion of creation, as the whole article shows, in which Aquinas attempts to meet the
arguments of the holy Fathers in explaining the matter of how to understand that Scrip-
ture refers to six days in the narrative of creation in Genesis 1 rather than one, since God
is said to create all thing simultaneously. Dr. Hannon should have been more careful in
both his readings of Aquinas and Prof Carroll, and in his explanation of both their pos-
itions. This simple detail would have sufficed to avoid such misunderstanding.
Hannon finishes this section of the paper accusing Prof Carroll of offering a “gross
mis-interpretation of his [Aquinas’] ontology of creation” with his understanding of
the idea that creation is not a change, because he (Prof Carroll) does not pay attention
to the theological discussions Aquinas offers, which, for Dr. Hannon, show that God
does effect change in the world by creation. Dr. Hannon’s problem is clear: he identifies
the philosophical with the theological understanding of creation, misreading both
Aquinas and Prof Carroll’s ideas.
In the following section Hannon strongly affirms on page 294 that “Carroll fails to
explain why an eternally existing universe would have to depend on God as the cause
for its existence,” though acknowledging, on the same page, that Prof Carroll under-
stands that “Being itself needs a cause.” If this is not the reason Dr. Hannon is looking
for, then he clearly does not understand Aquinas’ discussion on the eternity of the uni-
verse, something which Prof Carroll discusses at length in many of his publications. In
these discussions Aquinas argues that precisely because creation is the giving of being
to things created, this giving can be eternal or have a temporal beginning. This is the
basic analysis of the philosophical sense of creation, a sense that prescinds from any ques-
tion of the universe’s temporality. Theologically speaking, however, one can know that
creation has a temporal beginning, a fact that Prof Carroll acknowledges all over his
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work (written and spoken throughout the world), even when philosophically, an eternal
creation is not contradictory: “From his earliest to his last writings on the subject,
Thomas maintains that it is possible for there to be an eternal, created universe. On
the basis of faith Thomas holds that the universe is not eternal. But he thinks that God
could have created a universe that is eternal. Although reason affirms the intelligibility
of an eternal, created universe, Aquinas thought that reason alone leaves unresolved
the question of whether the universe is eternal…Near the end of his career, in De aeter-
nitate mundi, Thomas will take up, in his most sophisticated treatise on the subject, the
intelligibility of an eternal, created universe. There he will write: ‘to say that something
has been made by God and that it has always existed, is not logically inconsistent.’9
Hannon might reply that his use of Prof Carroll’s words “Being itself needs a cause”
referred to the question of why God does not need a causal explanation. A short linguistic
turnmight be helpful here. Aswe are all well aware, the English language uses the same term
“being” for two very distinct and technical Latin terms that Aquinas distinguishes, namely
“esse” and “ens.” It seems rather evident that Prof Carroll’s claim that “being itself needs a
cause” refers to “ens” and not to “esse,” hence requiring not a causal explanation of God’s
being (esse), but rather a casual explanation of the being of created things, each ofwhich is an
ens. Certainly, Hannon is aware of this difference as the end of his paragraph shows, but he
somehow accuses Prof Carroll of not knowing of it, something rather odd to say about an
expert on Aquinas, who has written that God is not “an entity among other entities.”10
Having in mind Aquinas’ and Prof Carroll’s discussions about the eternity of the
world, I must say that it is quite ironic to find a sort of defence of the kalam cosmological
argument in Hannon’s paper, arguing against Prof Carroll that the theory of Big Bang
could offer any insight into the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Hannon argues that “if
the Big Bang does represent the moment at which matter, energy, space and time were
all brought into existence,” then William Lane Craig would be correct, and Prof
Carroll wrong in affirming that “we do not get closer to creation by getting closer to
the Big Bang.” I fail to see the motivation behind Hannon’s statement in favour of the
kalam cosmological argument, but I do not fail to see that Hannon, even when acknowl-
edging that the Big Bang theory receives different interpretations as to what it means, is
affirming (conditionally) something with which scientists are not in common agreement.
This is precisely the peril against which Prof Carroll warns us: not to make our metaphy-
sics and theology dependant on an unresolved scientific theory (as any other scientific
theory, since all of them are unresolved to a certain extent), following on Aquinas’
own strategy, because, as Prof Carroll explains,
Thomas thinks that reason alone cannot know whether or not the universe is eternal. It is, he
thinks, an error to try to reason to creation ex nihilo by attempting to show scientifically that the
world has a temporal beginning. Nevertheless, for Thomas, reason can show, in the discipline of
metaphysics, that the world has an origin: that it is created ex nihilo. The affirmation in faith that
the universe has a temporal beginning perfects what reason knows about creation.11
After all, if, as Hannon accepts, God is continuously creating the universe, then there is
no need to conflate the origin of the universe, which is for both Aquinas and Prof Carroll
in God, and the beginning of the universe, which according to the Big Bang theory hap-
pened 14 billion years ago.12 Even the father of the Big Bang theory, Catholic priest and
cosmologist Georges Lemaître, acknowledges this distinction and is unwilling to identify
his “primeval atom” with the moment of creation!13
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Still, if we were to assume Hannon’s hypothesis that the Big Bang represents the
moment in which the universe’s matter, energy, space and time were brought into exist-
ence and thus identify it with the act of creation, then Prof Carroll would certainly be glad
to say that creation in this sense is not a change, and hence not an act within the natural
world. The issue is, once again, that scientists today are not certain that Hannon’s
hypothesis is correct, and in fact, many are suggesting alternative cosmological models
for the beginning of the universe in which we live. As Prof Carroll notes, many cosmol-
ogists often speak of what happened before the Big Bang.
Ultimately, it seems that Hannon is falling into the trap of a god-of-the-gaps, as is
evident from the following argument about the origin of life in his text. He claims on
page 295 that the organic origin of life on earth is such an exceptional historical event
that it is “a rare example of where a supernatural intervention does at least appear poss-
ible due to the lack of a valid scientific explanation.” This statement is far too clear: there
is no scientific explanation, hence we can invoke on God to fill in the gap. I will neither go
into the fate that such explanations underwent in history (think of Newton’s God as the
paradigm) nor into the theological difficulties this approach brings for the methodologi-
cal relations between science and theology, for both these themes have been extensively
explored in the past. Let me simply suggest that this strategy has brought no good at all to
theology throughout history. If any, this is doubtless a good lesson to be learnt from some
past interaction between science and theology. Am I, then, claiming that science can
explain the origin of organic life on earth? Yes, it might in some future days. Still, I do
not agree with the claim that if this is true, then “the origin of life has nothing directly
to do with any divine plan,” as Hannon affirms on the same page. As I will discuss
bellow, in the perspective of Thomas Aquinas (and of Prof Carroll), God does make
use of secondary created causes to instrument his plan for creation, including the
origin of organic life and human beings.
It is here where Hannon mixes up the issues of extrinsic design and intrinsic teleology,
two very distinct notions that need to be accounted for, and the difference of which needs
to be acknowledged, if one wants to assume Aquinas’ philosophy as one’s own. As I have
shown elsewhere,14 these two terms are rather different, and Aquinas would favour
understanding God’s providence to work through intrinsic teleology, through the act
of creation in the way that Prof Carroll understands it, while from the seventeenth
century authors such as Robert Boyle would assume that God extrinsically imposes
some external teleology to created things. This difference has to do with the distinct
natural philosophies assumed in each epoch, namely an Aristotelian framework in
which formal and final causes were proper to created things, and an atomistic philosophy
in which atoms were conceived as being purely pieces of matter without formal causes,
needing, hence, an extrinsic influx from God to be directed towards God’s end. If we
acknowledge this distinction, then we can see why Hannon’s analysis of the Aquinas-
inspired Catholic Catechism claim that “God is the first cause who operates in and
through secondary causes” fails. God acts “as the over-arching providential cause,
giving direction to a series of ordinary causes that were themselves completely
natural,” not as Hannon affirms because natural causes are insufficient. This would
mean that, to be able to act, God requires insufficient natural causes, a rather odd
claim within a Thomistic analysis. Instead, the Catechism’s claim means that God, by
creating natural tendencies in natural things, providentially guides the development of
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the world and human history.15 Could God have used this metaphysical mechanism to
give place to the origin of organic life on earth? Certainly.
Hannon moves on then to affirming that Aquinas upholds the possibility of miracles,
in the sense that God could produce things that go beyond the natural created powers,
hinting that Prof Carroll denies such doctrine when he (Prof Carroll) insists that God
cannot be assumed to be a cause among causes. I certainly fail to see how this is so,
given that for Aquinas (and Prof Carroll) even when God produces a miracle God acts
as a first cause, creating the whole being of that miracle at that precise point, and
hence not as a cause among causes, that is, as a created cause that is required to act
according to the order of nature. In fact, it would be surprising to find anyone within
Thomistic circles who would be happy to affirm that God requires the insufficient
agency of natural causes to produce a miracle, as Hannon seems to suggest. God can
perform any miracle at any time regardless of the sufficiency or insufficiency of
natural causes. When Prof Carroll says that God is not a cause among causes, he is
not denying that God’s causality is essential for the existence and operations of all crea-
tures; rather, he is pointing to the fact that God is not a cause in the same way that crea-
tures are causes.
The final paragraph of Hannon’s second section summarises his worry. He insists that
Prof Carroll’s teachings mean that God is precluded from acting in the created universe in
any sense but for a distant and remote creative act. In his words, Carroll’s “extreme nat-
uralism precludes any possibility that God can causally act to effect change in the material
world. The only thing that God can do is act to prevent everything from becoming
nothing.”WhatHannon fails to see with his claims is that Aquinas’ doctrine of providence
through secondary causes flows seamlessly from his doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, which is
also the spirit of the Catholic Catechism’s statements, and as Prof Carroll teaches:
Created beings can and do function as real secondary causes, causes which can be discovered
in the natural sciences. God as cause so transcends the created order that He can cause crea-
tures to be causes…Creatures are what they are (including those which are free), precisely
because God is present to them as cause. Were God to withdraw, all that exists would cease
to be. Creaturely agency and the integrity of nature, in general, are guaranteed by God’s
creative causality.16
One only needs to look at the treatment that Aquinas offers in his explanations of pro-
vidence in the Summa Contra Gentiles or the Disputed Questions on the Power of God (or
any other place where Aquinas discusses the doctrine of providence), to see the intimate
relation that it has with his doctrine of creation as Prof Carroll explains it.
Hannon starts the following and last section of his paper by referring to Prof Carroll’s
caution in reading Scripture, particularly the account of creation in Genesis 1. It would
have been appropriate, I believe, to note how Prof Carroll’s caution follows in the steps of
Thomas Aquinas’, who precisely in the question of the Summa Theologiae to which
Hannon referred in the previous section is as cautious as Prof Carroll. Just after consider-
ing, in his Summa Theologiae I, q. 74, a. 2, the different approaches that the Fathers take
on the number of days that God used in creating the universe, Aquinas warns us that all
their “arguments must be met,” as if offering the advice of not rushing in our readings of
the sacred text but consider the arguments with care and caution. Aquinas has this same
attitude towards Scripture all throughout his work, from his early writings commenting
on Peter Lombard’s Sentences to the end of his Summa Theologiae. Still, Hannon uses his
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particular take on Prof Carroll’s attitude to Scripture to advance a new objection to his
understanding of creation and divine action in the world.
Hannon boldly affirms by the end of page 297 that Prof Carroll’s “strict demarcation
between the causality of divine action at a purely metaphysical level and secondary causes
at a physical level is unjustified and unnecessary since they are likely intimately inter-
twined.” This statement would certainly be surprising for many of Prof Carroll’s
readers, given his constant insistence that
God does not only give being to things when they first begin to exist, He also causes being in
them so long as they exist. He not only causes the operative powers to exist in things when
these things come into being, He always causes these powers in things. Thus, if God’s crea-
tive act were to cease, every operation would cease; every operation of a thing has God as its
ultimate cause.17
Prof Carroll, following on Aquinas’ teaching, does nothing but affirm the most intimate
relation between the first cause and secondary causes, and hence it is rather Hannon’s
claim that is simply “unnecessary and unjustified.” One needs only to consider the fol-
lowing words by Prof Carroll:
God is immediately active in all things and, in an important sense, God is more intimate to
each creature than a creature is to itself. God, as the cause of each creature’s being, is present
at the very center of each creature’s being. He is more interior to things than they are to
themselves.18
These words echo Aquinas’ own, for instance, when commenting on the initial lines of
the Gospel of John:
God acts in all things as an interior agent, because he acts by creating. Now to create is to
give being (esse) to the thing created. So, since esse is most intimate in each thing, God, who
by acting gives esse, acts in things as an intimate agent,19
or in hisDisputed Questions on Truth, where he further qualifies this statement in the way
Prof Carroll understands Aquinas’ doctrine: “God Himself is the proper and immediate
cause of each thing, and in some way He is more intimate to each thing than the thing is
to itself, as Augustine says.”20
Hannon follows listing a number of instances in which God is said to act in the world
directly (the Incarnation and the creation of human souls). Still, he either fails to recog-
nise that these are instances of miraculous divine action, something to which Prof Carroll
has never objected, or he assumes that God’s miraculous actions are not instances of his
acting as first cause. The former seems certainly not to be the case, since Hannon appears
to defend the fact that God does act miraculously in the universe against some rather ill-
crafted version of what Prof Carroll teaches. So, the latter option seems to be what
Hannon holds. The problem here is that Aquinas (and Prof Carroll) teaches that God
acts as first cause in all His actions, as the quotation above of his commentary to the
Gospel of John shows. Of course, God is the creator of the human soul in a real sense
(something that worries Hannon to a great extent), but, in Aquinas’ doctrine, this activity
of the creation of the human soul is a miraculous action in the manner of the first cause,
that is, in the giving of esse.
Hannon’s worries seem to reduce to the fact that he understands the metaphysical
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo as Prof Carroll teaches it to be nothing but a metaphorical
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account of creation, even suggesting that Prof Carroll’s account is reduced to the Neo-
Platonic doctrine of emanation. This is clearly not the case, as I have shown in this
paper. Ironically, still, Aquinas himself uses the language of emanation to speak of
creation! When explaining his own doctrine of creation in the very Summa Theologiae
I, q. 45, a. 1, Aquinas affirms, among the fourteen times that he uses the term “ema-
nation” in that question, that “this emanation of things we designate with the name of
creation.”
Ultimately, Hannon believes that in Prof Carroll’s account of Aquinas’ doctrine of cre-
ation, “we have the ultimate retreat since divine agency is banished to an obscure place
where science can never touch it,” because of Prof Carroll’s “insistence that creation can
never involve change, and that all change within the world must be entirely natural.” But
such a claim involves a false dichotomy. Here again we see Hannon’s temptation for a
“God-of-the-gaps,” for he alludes to God’s action being subject to the scrutiny of the
natural sciences. By contrast, instead of considering these features of Aquinas’ doctrine
a weakness, Prof Carroll believes that they are its major strength, because they show how
creatures are real causes, created to be such by God’s own causal power. Indeed, as Prof
Carroll points out, all changes are caused by God, but not in such a way as to deny the
reality of natural causes. God causes changes to be the changes that they are, but such
divine causing is not itself a change. Prof Carroll’s teachings point to the metaphysical
fact that the creative act, in its most profound and real sense, can never involve a
change, because changes require something that changes, whereas the divine act of cre-
ation is, absolutely speaking, out of nothing else but the power and goodness of God.
Were God in need of some kind of stuff to create at any point in the history of the uni-
verse (or in need of some kind of insufficiency in natural causal processes to act provi-
dentially within that universe), then God would not be, absolutely speaking, the origin of
all things that exist and act. Aquinas’ doctrine, represented and explained in Prof Car-
roll’s works, detracts neither from the power of natural created causes to be such (and
hence subject to the inquiry of the natural sciences), nor from the power of God, who
is active in the created universe both by performing miracles and in and through second-
ary created causes, always as the first cause of everything that is.
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